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Abstract 
 
The international statuses of currencies shape a fundamental characteristic of the 
international monetary system, which has significant impacts on the world political 
economy by affecting the political as well as economic relationships among states. The 
study of international currencies has been long dominated largely by economists, however, 
with political economy research in this area quite underdeveloped. However, the 2008/9 
global financial crisis, the subsequent European debt crisis and the recent active Chinese 
promotion of renminbi internationalization have spurred new and considerable interest 
among political economists on issues surrounding international currencies. Political 
economy study of international currencies has thus been gradually growing of late, and 
making notable progress.     
 This study provides a comprehensive and systematic review of the literature on 
international currencies—covering both political economy and economics—with the 
primary aim of building a useful groundwork to help develop a better research framework 
for the political economy study of them. In particular, it discusses the international currency 
concept, the costs and benefits of international currency issuance, the determinants of 
currency internationalization, and the future prospects of the current dollar-centered 
international monetary system. This research in addition highlights a group of important 
issues that need further investigation by future political economy study of international 
currencies, by drawing special attention to the following issues: historical events, the 
political determinants of currency internationalization, government policy strategies, and 
the consequences of international currency choice. 
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I. Introduction  
 
The international standings of currencies form a principal characteristic of the international 
monetary order, which shapes the world economic and political system by influencing the 
economic and political relationships among states. Despite their great impact on the world 
political economy, however, and with a few notable exceptions,
1
 the political economy 
literature has until recently not paid much attention to the issues surrounding international 
currencies, and their discussion has as a result been long dominated by economists. 
Economists initiated extensive debate about the future of the US dollar (hereafter, “the 
dollar”) as the dominant international currency as early as in the late 1960s, when the 
sustainability of the Bretton Woods system began to be questioned. And disputes among 
them about the dollar’s future as leading international currency have emerged almost any 
time the dollar has lost substantial value, with particular intensification since launch of the 
euro in 1999.
2
 The contrasting low interest in international currencies on the part of 
political economy scholarship is in fact a bit odd, considering that one of the founding 
studies for international political economy as an academic discipline, Susan Strange’s 1971 
Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of an International Currency in Decline, dealt 
with the political economy of international currencies.  
 The outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2008/9 has reignited vibrant debate over 
the global monetary order, however, and finally now attracted substantial attention from the 
political economy as well as economics circles. The debate initially began with competing 
future prospects for the current dollar-centered international monetary system, as the 
financial crisis had originated from the United States and US crisis management policies 
had stirred strong concerns about the dollar’s future as leading international currency. The 
subsequent European debt crisis, emerging from 2010, has extended the debate into one on 
the euro’s future as well, with fears growing of a possible breakup of the single currency. In 
the meantime, the Chinese government has since the global financial crisis suddenly begun 
to push enthusiastically ahead with internationalization of its currency, the renminbi, 
generating intense debate over the feasibility of that objective.
3
 Against this background, 
political economy research on international currencies has been gradually growing in recent 
years.          
 This study attempts a systematic review of the literature on international currencies, 
with the aim of providing useful foundations to help develop a better analytical framework 
for their study. It focuses particularly on the following issues: the international currency 
concept, the costs and benefits of issuing an international currency, the determinants of 
currency internationalization, and the future prospects of the current dollar-centered 
international monetary order. The discussion encompasses not only the political economy 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Kirshner (1995) and Cohen (1998).  
2 Exchange rates are in fact only an imperfect indicator of a currency’s international standing, since that 
depends fundamentally on the currency’s use rather than its price (Cohen 2009a: 742).  
3 The renminbi is also known popularly as the yuan. The renminbi, meaning “people’s money” in Chinese, is 
the official name of China’s currency, while the yuan, which literally means “round” in Chinese, is its primary 
unit.  
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but also the economics (including economic history) literature, given that the latter has led 
the study of international currencies over the past decades and that much of the political 
economy research in this area relies on its findings. This research in addition highlights a 
group of issues salient to the future political economy study of international currencies. 
Given that political economy research on international currencies is still in its early stage, 
there are in fact a number of significant issues awaiting further investigation.    
 This study is organized as follows. It first discusses the concept of an international 
currency, and then examines the costs and benefits of issuing one. It next addresses the 
economic and political factors that affect currency internationalization. Following this it 
examines and assesses conflicting prospects for the futures of the dollar as well as its 
primary potential rivals, the euro and the renminbi. It then moves on to consider issues on 
which more research is needed for further development of the study of international 
currencies, before providing conclusions in the final section.   
 
 
II. Conceptualization of international currencies 
 
An international currency is usually defined as a currency that is used elsewhere beyond its 
home country. The concept can be further elaborated for more systematic analysis, however, 
through either of two broadly distinct ways. One is to conceptualize an international 
currency in terms of its functions, and the other to categorize international currencies in 
accordance with the natures of the factors supporting their international use. The former 
approach is widely adopted in economics research, while the latter is used increasingly in 
political economy study.
4
 
 
Functional conceptualization 
 
Conceptualizing international currencies on the basis of their monetary functions is the 
most widely used practice. This method was proposed by Benjamin Cohen (1971) in his 
writings in the early 1970s about the British pound sterling, and subsequently refined by 
Peter Kenen (1983), Paul Krugman (1984) and others. Just like a domestic currency, an 
international currency performs the three functions of money—as a medium of exchange, a 
unit of account, and a store of value. It does so at two distinct levels, however, for private 
and public transactions, and accordingly plays six roles in total. As a medium of exchange, 
it is used by private actors to settle international economic transactions or by governments 
as a foreign exchange market intervention currency. As a unit of account, at the private 
level it denominates international economic transactions while at the public level playing 
the role of an anchor to which governments peg their currencies. As a store of value, it is 
used as an investment asset at the private level or as a reserve currency at the public level. 
                                                 
4 Meanwhile, Christian Thimann (2009) suggests a new concept, the “global” roles of currencies, which 
encompasses both the cross-border and the domestic uses of currencies to reflect their overall importances in 
the world economy. 
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Each of these six functions can be interrelated with the others to some extent, although not 
inevitably (Cohen 1971).
5
  
 This functional conceptualization of international currencies contributes significantly to 
their study by providing an analytical framework for evaluating currency 
internationalization in terms of the scope of the monetary functions of the currency 
concerned.
6
 Cohen (1971), for example, divides international currencies into two broad 
groups: “fully developed” international currencies, which perform all six money roles, and 
“partial” international currencies, which perform only some of them. In a later study 
(Cohen 1998), he goes further to classify currencies into seven categories—according to 
not only the scopes of their monetary functions but also the geographical ranges of their 
use.
7
  
 The number of currencies that perform all six roles of an international currency on a 
truly global scale is obviously very limited, with the dollar currently the only one that does 
so. Some currencies such as the euro and the yen also perform all of those roles, but only 
within more limited geographical regions. Other currencies usually perform only some of 
the six money roles.   
 
Political economy conceptualization 
 
As mentioned earlier, the political economy approach in the study of international 
currencies was pioneered by Strange (1971), who like Cohen (1971) considered sterling in 
the early 1970s. Directing attention to the politics of international currencies, Strange raised 
the following two questions: “Under what political, as distinct from economic, 
circumstances do people start to use—either for all or for only some monetary purposes—a 
currency which is either issued or controlled by a state other than their own?”; and “What 
political consequences can be expected to follow, for both parties, from this international 
                                                 
5 For example, a currency’s role as an anchor currency or a reserve currency may increase the private sector 
demand for it, given that currency ties tend to encourage trade links, capital flows and economic integration 
between economies (Posen 2008: 86-87).   
6
 Empirical studies of international currency choice have nevertheless focused usually on the currency 
compositions of foreign exchange reserves as the main indicator of the international use of currencies—due 
largely to the high availability of the data, which has been publicly provided by the IMF, and to the 
expectation that the factors determining the reserve currency role are similar to those affecting the other 
international currency functions. The IMF data has several drawbacks, however. It for example does not cover 
China, holder of the largest amount of foreign exchange reserves in the world. Currency compositions can 
also change owing to fluctuations in value of the currencies held, rather than changes in central bank choice. 
Recently, studies examining variables other than foreign exchange reserves as indicators of currencies’ 
international uses have been increasing. Goldberg and Tille (2005), for instance, analyze the choice of 
currency in invoicing international trade transactions, while Meissner and Oomes (2008) examine the 
determinants of anchor currency choice. Research such as Cohen (2005), Flandreau and Jobst (2009) and 
Habib and Joy (2008) address currency choice for international bond security denomination and the 
circulations of currencies in the foreign exchange markets. Meanwhile, Truman and Wong (2006) present 
changes in the quantity share of the dollar in foreign exchange reserves reported in the IMF data, to thereby 
eliminate valuation effects. 
7
 The seven categories are “top currency,” “patrician currency,” “elite currency,” “plebeian currency,” 
“permeated currency,” “quasi-currency” and “pseudo-currency.” 
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use of currency?” In addressing these questions, Strange classified international currencies 
into four categories: “master currencies,” “top currencies,” “negotiated currencies” and 
“neutral currencies,” highlighting how both economic and political factors shape currencies’ 
international uses.  
 A master currency is the currency of a hegemonic or imperial state that coerces its use 
by other states. It thus always derives its status from the political relationships between the 
issuing and the subordinate states. Sterling in the sterling area and the French franc in the 
franc zone in the past were examples. A top currency, in contrast, is one that is most 
favored by the world market for various monetary purposes due to its economic superiority. 
Its status is therefore determined primarily by economic factors, and it tends to be the 
currency of the predominant state in the world economy. The dollar in the 1950s was one 
example. A negotiated currency meanwhile occurs when the issuing state bargains or 
negotiates politically with other states for their use of its currency, offering inducements 
such as military and diplomatic support or economic benefits. Examples of negotiated 
currencies include sterling in the postwar period and the dollar in the 1960s.
8
 Finally, a 
neutral currency is a currency whose international use stems primarily from the strong, but 
not necessarily dominant, economic position of its issuing state, which has no interest in 
promoting its international use. Examples include the Swiss franc and the deutschmark 
during the postwar period (Strange 1971). Importantly, Strange emphasizes that this 
typology of international currencies is not entirely mutually exclusive, and that some 
currencies can be of more than one type at the same time. Even if a certain currency is a top 
currency for some users, for example, it can also be a master, neutral or negotiated currency 
for others.     
 This political economy typology of international currencies provides a useful 
framework for analyzing the effects of political as well as economic factors on international 
currency status, to thereby expand our understanding of the mechanisms through which a 
currency is used internationally. And although this typology had in fact been neglected for 
a long time, Eric Helleiner (2008) has shed new light on it recently, and since then a 
growing number of political economy studies of international currencies use it, paying 
particular attention to the top currency and negotiated currency concepts.
9
  
 
 
III. Consequences of international currency issuance 
 
An international currency benefits the world economy by facilitating cross-border trade and 
investment in a way similar to that through which a national currency contributes to the 
national economy. Yet the costs and benefits of an international currency to the issuing 
                                                 
8 Strange (1971) characterizes a negotiated currency primarily as a currency in decline, that is, one that has 
lost or is losing its political dominance as a master currency or its economic dominance as a top currency. As 
Helleiner (2008) points out, however, a negotiated currency can also be a currency on the rise, if its increasing 
international use owes partly to the political relationships between the state issuing it and others, as well as to 
its economic attractiveness. 
9 See, for example, Helleiner and Kirshner (2009b). 
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state itself are more ambiguous. The state issuing an international currency may enjoy 
significant benefits, but it may also bear substantial costs, making aggregate net cost-
benefit calculation complicated. Indeed, some states have endeavored to facilitate 
internationalization of their currencies in pursuit of the benefits, while others have 
deliberately held back from it for fear of the costs. What are the major costs and benefits of 
issuing an international currency? The main economic benefits consist of international 
seigniorage, macroeconomic flexibility, reduced currency mismatch problems, business 
gains by financial institutions, lower exchange rate risks for firms and growing purchasing 
power for consumers. The major economic costs in contrast include constraints on 
macroeconomic policy autonomy and decreasing competitiveness of the export and import-
competing sectors. Meanwhile, there is also a significant political benefit—of an increase 
in the issuing state’s international power.10 
 
The economic perspective 
 
One of the most familiar benefits of issuing an international currency may be seigniorage, 
which refers to the revenue or profit derived from printing currency. Seigniorage is 
generated at the international level when foreigners hold the domestic currency, or financial 
claims denominated in it, in exchange for traded goods and services. In more detail, 
seigniorage from issuing an international currency can emerge in two different forms. 
Firstly, foreign holdings of cash—bank notes and coins—are equivalent to interest-free 
loans from foreigners to the issuing state, as no interest is paid for it, and the issuing state 
can enjoy interest savings as a result. According to one estimate, about 60 percent of all US 
Federal Reserve (hereafter Fed) notes are circulating outside the United States, and at a 
borrowing cost of 4 percent the ensuing interest savings for the US government amounts to 
about 0.1 percent of GDP (some $18 billion a year). Seigniorage also arises in the form of 
reduced borrowing costs for the issuing state, measured as the difference between the 
(higher) returns on foreign assets acquired by the issuing state and the (lower) cost of its 
foreign liabilities. These gains arise, in part, as increased demand for assets denominated in 
the home currency tends to reduce the required return on them by increasing their liquidity. 
The US seigniorage deriving from this source is estimated to amount to from one to three 
percent of GDP (Cohen 2012a: 16-17).
11
  
 A more significant benefit accruing to the state issuing an international currency may 
be its ability to finance balance of payments deficits with its own currency, and the 
resulting expansion in its macroeconomic flexibility.
12
 In this regard, the US ability to run 
                                                 
10 It should be noted, however, that despite the long list of the costs and benefits of international currency 
issuance, many studies recognize only a limited set of them. Most economics research generally neglects the 
political ones, focusing on those with high data availability. For examples of such analyses, see Cohen 
(2012a: 25-26).  
11 According to one estimate, the annual return on US investments overseas is 1.2 percent higher than its 
payments on overseas debt (Chinn and Frankel 2007: 289). Cooper (2009), however, argues that such US 
gains stem from US investors’ risk taking, rather than seigniorage, pointing out that the share of equities in 
US foreign assets is higher than that in US foreign liabilities.   
12 See Cohen (1971: 34-43; 2012a: 17-18), Kirshner (2008: 424) and Salant (1964). 
7 
 
balance of payments deficits by printing extra dollars was once criticized as US “exorbitant 
privilege” by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, a French finance minister in the 1960s 
(Eichengreen 2011a: 4).
13
 Much emphasis has been traditionally placed on this ability of 
the issuing country to run balance of payments deficits. Recently, however, greater 
attention is being paid to its ability to evade the effects of market discipline on its 
macroeconomic policies in general. It is also increasingly stressed that the ability to borrow 
internationally in the domestic currency reduces the problem of currency mismatches, from 
which many emerging market economies have suffered severely during financial crises 
including the recent global one (Dobson and Masson 2009: 125; Genberg 2010: 66-67).  
 In addition, domestic financial institutions, firms and consumers may benefit from 
currency internationalization. The domestic banking sector may gain in business through its 
competitive advantage in dealing in the home currency, particularly as it has privileged 
access to the resources of its country’s central bank and can thus create monetary liabilities 
denominated in the currency more easily (Cohen 2012a: 15-16; Swoboda 1968: 14). 
Swoboda (1968: 14) calls these gains “denomination rents.” Both banks and non-bank 
financial institutions may also benefit from higher foreign demand for a broad set of 
financial services (such as in trade finance, the foreign exchange business, or investment 
services) from the financial markets and institutions in the issuing state, due partly to their 
familiarity with the currency and partly to the financial markets’ breadth and depth for that 
currency. These gains can also be considered denomination rents in a broad sense 
(Helleiner and Malkin 2012: 35-36). And the resultant more profitable financial sector may 
in turn benefit the domestic non-financial sector as well, through the lowering of costs of 
capital in the economy (Kenen 2009: 6).  
 Meanwhile, domestic firms, and particularly those heavily engaged in cross-border 
activities, may benefit by the shifting of exchange rate risk to their foreign counterparts 
(Tavlas 1991: 12); although the development of derivatives has increased the ease of 
hedging against exchange rate risk, hedging is costly. Moreover, domestic consumers may 
also profit, as their purchasing power grows with the rise in the currency’s value due to its 
broad acceptability (Kannan 2009; Wright and Trejos 2001). 
 However, as noted, there can also be substantial costs involved in issuing an 
international currency. Indeed, it is widely indicated that Japan and Germany were in the 
past reluctant to push internationalization of their currencies due to such costs. Among the 
main costs are the constraints on domestic monetary policy due to foreign holdings of the 
currency, which compromise the gain in macroeconomic flexibility through international 
currency issuance. Foreign holdings of a currency may render demand for the currency less 
stable, and where the main focus of a central bank’s monetary policy is on control of the 
monetary aggregates therefore complicate setting of the appropriate target rate for money 
supply growth. Where the central bank’s main monetary policy tool is the setting of short-
term interest rates, meanwhile, internationalization of the domestic currency may limit its 
ability to affect rates through open market operations, by broadening the scope for purchase 
and sale by residents and nonresidents of financial instruments denominated in the currency 
                                                 
13 The term “exorbitant privilege” is often misattributed to French President Charles de Gaulle, but it was in 
fact coined by Giscard, his finance minister (Eichengreen 2011a: 4). 
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(although this limitation tends to decrease for countries with large domestic government 
debt markets, such as the United States) (Genberg 2010: 64-65; Kenen 2009: 7).  
 The domestic policy of the state issuing an international currency is also constrained 
due to its accompanying international responsibilities. This problem is best illustrated by 
the so-called Triffin Dilemma, presented by economist Robert Triffin in 1947: that the 
country issuing the major reserve currency must supply it to the world in order to lubricate 
world trade and growth, but that unlimited supply of the currency will eventually erode 
confidence in its value, exposing the country to the risk of foreigners abruptly reducing or 
liquidating their holdings of its currency (Eichengreen 1996: 113-135; 2011a: 49-62). In 
order to keep foreigners using the currency, especially when their incentives to do so 
weaken, the issuing state may have to compromise its domestic policy goals. The Triffin 
Dilemma was originally described in reference to the fixed exchange rate system under 
Bretton Woods, but is applicable to any country issuing a consequential international 
currency including the contemporary United States. 
 Additionally, where other states peg their currencies to an anchor currency, the state 
issuing that currency loses its ability to use the exchange rate as a macroeconomic policy 
tool (Cohen 1971: 42). Appreciation of the domestic currency due to its increasing 
international acceptability may also hurt the economy’s export and import-competing 
sectors. 
 
The political economy perspective 
 
Meanwhile, political economy study emphasizes that the international use of a currency 
enhances the issuing state’s power—in particular its international monetary power, which 
exists when its monetary relationship with another state influences that state’s behavior 
(Andrews 2006: 1).   
 In greater detail, the international use of a currency boosts the issuing state’s policy 
autonomy, which is the internal aspect of its power, in two different ways. Firstly, the 
state’s policy autonomy strengthens as the international use of its currency increases its 
ability to avoid the burdens of adjustment of its external imbalances—either by “delaying” 
adjustment or by “deflecting” these burdens onto others (Cohen 2006; 2012a: 17-18). It is 
able to delay adjustment since it can finance its deficits effectively with its own money, as 
discussed above (Cohen 2006; 2012a: 17-18). It can also “deflect” its adjustment burdens 
onto others via its ability to depreciate its currency, in which its debt to foreigners is 
denominated, or by using the exchange rate as an instrument to pressure foreign countries 
to adopt expansionary macroeconomic policies to help improve its external balances 
without adjustment (Helleiner and Kirshner 2009a: 6; Henning 2005).
14
 The policy 
autonomy of the issuing state in this case, enhanced through either delay or deflection of 
adjustment, is autonomy from the markets. Yet its autonomy from other states is likely to 
increase as well, as its use of its own currency in international economic activities reduces 
                                                 
14
 Cohen (2006) argues that a lower degree of economic openness and a higher degree of economic 
adaptability increase the ability to deflect such adjustment burdens.  
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its dependence on foreign currencies, lowering foreign states’ capacities to influence it.15 
Meanwhile, given that autonomy is the essential precondition for influence over others, the 
rise in the state’s policy autonomy also boosts its potential for such influence, which 
comprises the external aspect of its power (Cohen 2006; 2012a: 17-18). 
 Moreover, going beyond mere provision of insulation from foreign influence, a 
currency’s international use is actually likely to increase its issuing state’s coercive 
power—its “hard power”—to influence other states in direct ways, as their dependence on 
the currency for international economic activities may confer substantial political leverage 
or advantages on the issuing state (Cohen 1998: 127-128; 2012a: 18-19; Kirshner 1995). 
For instance, the United States took advantage of other states’ dependence on the US-based 
dollar clearing network as a foreign policy instrument during the Panama crisis of the late 
1980s, and also in its international initiative to strengthen anti-money laundering regulation 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Helleiner 1999: 72-73; Kirshner 1995: 159-166).
16
 The dollar’s 
status as the world’s key currency also renders the United States capable of exercising 
substantial influence over international financial crisis management, as the country has 
unequalled ability to provide dollars for foreign governments and private financial 
institutions (Helleiner and Kirshner 2009a: 6).
17
  
 There may of course be limitations on the use of coercive power by the state issuing an 
international currency, as excessive application of such power may ultimately lead other 
states to seek ways of escaping dependence on the currency. However, the wide 
international use of a currency may also reduce the issuing state’s need to exercise coercive 
power, by enhancing its “soft power” and also its “structural power.”   
 The international use of a currency may strengthen the issuing state’s soft power—its 
ability to get others to do what it wants through cooption or attraction rather than use of 
coercion or payment—in a symbolic manner, since currencies have long been regarded as 
core, tangible symbols of sovereignty and their extensive cross-border uses as highly 
visible signs of the elevated ranks of the issuing countries (Cohen 1998: 121; 2012b: 19; 
Helleiner 2006: 82).
18
  
 Meanwhile, structural power in relation to currency internationalization may operate in 
two distinct ways (Kirshner 2008: 424-425). On the one hand, it may shape the framework 
within which actors relate to each other, which is close to Strange’s (1988) concept of 
structural power. For example, the dollar’s primary international status helps to ensure that 
discussions of the international monetary system take place within the context of dollar 
primacy. On the other hand, foreign actors’ dependence on an international currency may 
                                                 
15
 It will be discussed soon in detail how the state issuing an international currency can increase its influence 
over foreigners using its currency.  
16
 In fact, one of the origins of the eurodollar market was the Soviet Union’s placement of dollar deposits in 
London, which made it harder for the United States to freeze them (He and McCauley 2010: 4). 
17 During the recent global financial crisis, for example, the Fed provided dollar liquidity to major foreign 
countries through its currency swap lines, playing a critical role in helping to stabilize their economies. Such 
ability of the United States to support foreign countries in crisis may enhance its capacity to influence their 
policies in its favor in return. For further discussion of this issue, see Chey (2012b). 
18
 Acknowledging this function of an international currency, Nobel laureate economist Robert Mundell (1993) 
noted: “Great powers have great currencies.” 
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transform their perceptions of their own interests, something in line with Albert Hirshman’s 
(1980) concept of structural power, and which Kirshner (1995) calls “entrapment.” For 
instance, those who use the dollar tend to develop a vested interest in dollar stability, or 
may support close ties with the United States (Helleiner and Kirshner 2009a: 6).  
 
Relevant issues 
 
With regard to the consequences of international currency issuance, there are, among others, 
three noteworthy points. First, given the diverse monetary functions of international 
currencies, one salient question is how each of the international monetary functions is 
related to the specific costs and benefits of international currency issuance. Cohen (1971: 
43-51; 2012a: 22-24) provides an analysis of this issue, arguing that the international uses 
of a currency as a medium of exchange and as a unit account at both the public and private 
levels generate some microeconomic benefits—such as denomination rents or reduced 
transaction costs—while its use as a store of value at both levels creates substantial 
macroeconomic gains—such as seigniorage or macroeconomic flexibility. And among the 
two store of value roles, he also claims, it is the reserve currency role, rather than the 
private investment asset role, which enhances the issuing state’s capacity to exercise 
leverage over other states, because pressure can be exercised directly on foreign 
governments, unlike on decentralized financial markets, and because fewer currencies 
compete for the reserve currency than for the private investment asset role.
19
 
 Another point to stress is the domestic distributional effects of the costs and benefits of 
international currency issuance, since they affect the domestic politics of currency 
internationalization by influencing the formations of its domestic supporters and opponents 
(implying that national consensus on the net aggregate costs or benefits of currency 
internationalization is likely to be very rare). One of the first systematic attempts at analysis 
in this regard was Broz’s (1997) study of the origins of the Federal Reserve. Partly based 
on Frieden’s (1991) analysis of exchange rate regime choice, Broz for example identifies 
financial institutions whose international activities are substantial, to which denomination 
rents will accrue specifically, as the strongest advocates for currency internationalization. 
Individuals and firms whose economic activities are heavily domestically-oriented will 
meanwhile have the weakest preferences for currency internationalization, as they gain 
little if anything at all from it. Broz argues that large US financial institutions did indeed 
play leading roles in the internationalization of the dollar, strongly supporting the 1913 
creation of the Fed, an essential institutional arrangement for the development of US 
financial markets that boosted dollar internationalization.
20
 Recently, however, Chey 
(2012a: 69) and Helleiner and Malkin (2012) raise doubts about the generalizability of 
Broz’s analysis beyond the US case, and argue instead that the specific preferences of 
                                                 
19
 In this regard, Cohen (2012a: 29) suggests that a government’s strategies for facilitating internationalization 
of its currency be adjusted in accordance with its specific policy objectives in pursuing currency 
internationalization.    
20
 British financial interests also strongly supported the international use of sterling, in expectation of 
denomination rents from it (Helleiner and Malkin 2012: 36-37).  
11 
 
domestic groups regarding internationalization of their country’s currency are highly 
context specific.
21
  
 Finally, it should be emphasized that a currency’s superior international standing can 
never be permanent, and that the balance between the costs and the benefits of international 
currency issuance also changes over its lifetime. Foreign demand for a currency usually 
rises in the early stages of its international use, while declining over time as its supply 
expands beyond the point of its need. The costs of issuing an international currency are as a 
result likely to increase over time, and the benefits to decline (Cohen 1998: 124-129; 
2012a: 24). The experience of sterling is a good illustration of this tendency. Sterling’s 
status as the primary international currency before World War Two allowed Britain to 
finance its huge military expenditure during the war. After the war, however, as sterling’s 
international position was permanently taken over by the dollar, its debt overhang from the 
war became a vexing problem for the country, complicating management of its economic 
decline and exacerbating its chronic financial crises during the 1960s (Eichengreen 1996: 
103; 2011a: 40-42; Kirshner 2008: 426).  
 
 
IV. Determinants of currency internationalization 
 
Although the net aggregate consequence of international currency issuance is not apparent, 
certain states have attempted to promote internationalization of their currencies—aiming to 
grasp its potential benefits while being willing to bear its potential costs. They have not 
always succeeded, however.
22
 A critical question that follows, then, will be what factors 
ultimately determine currency internationalization. And economists have long endeavored 
to address this question, presenting a list of possible economic factors while generally 
neglecting political factors.
23
 Political economists have in recent years also begun to pay 
growing attention to this issue, fortunately, and provided a complementary analytical 
framework.  
 
Economic factors 
 
The various economic factors cited as the major determinants of competitiveness for 
international currency status can be largely grouped into two categories—confidence and 
convenience—with those that affect convenience subject to additional division into the two 
subcategories of liquidity and transactional network.
24
  
                                                 
21
 In fact, the constituents of the domestic supporters and opponents of currency internationalization in the 
United States, Japan and Germany all differed. For further details on this issue, see Helleiner and Malkin 
(2012).   
22
 One example is the Japanese government’s drive for yen internationalization from the late 1990s. See 
Grimes (2003) and Katada (2008). 
23
 Mundell, for example, anticipates that: “The RMB [renminbi] is likely to become a reserve currency in the 
future, even if the government of China does nothing about it” (Barboza 2011).  
24
 Helleiner (2008) provides a trichotomy of the economic determinants of international currency status. He 
however neglects the property common to liquidity and transactional network, of convenience—perhaps 
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 Confidence in the stability of a currency’s value is critical to its international use, as 
instability in a currency’s value raises the risk of holding it, thus diminishing its 
attractiveness as a store of value. The confidence in a currency can be affected by diverse 
factors, including the monetary and fiscal policies of the issuing country government, and 
its current account and net debtor positions—all of which affect its solvency risk (Lim 
2006: 7; Tavlas and Ozeki 1992: 19). 
 Liquidity is another primary economic attribute of an international currency, as users 
normally hold their international money in the form of liquid, interest-bearing assets rather 
than currency balances. The existence of well-developed and open financial markets in the 
issuing country, which lower the currency’s transaction costs, is accordingly important for 
its international use (Lim 2006: 7). Indeed, the dollar’s rise as an international currency 
took place only after creation of the Fed in 1913, which as mentioned earlier contributed 
significantly to US financial market development (Broz 1997). Sterling’s position as the 
leading international currency was also supported by the London financial markets. In 
contrast, meanwhile, the tightly regulated financial markets in Japan and Germany were 
frequently indicated as the principal obstacles to internationalization of the yen and the 
deutschmark (Aliber 1964; Tavlas 1991).  
 The international use of a currency is affected by the scale of the issuing country’s 
transactional network in the world economy as well, since the benefits of using a particular 
currency increase with the number of other parties using it due to network externalities, just 
as with the global use of English as a lingua franca (Kindleberger 1967). Factors 
determining the issuing country’s integration into the world economy, such as its economic 
size and its world trade share, thus influence the currency’s international use. Yet network 
externalities also give rise to inertia and path dependency in the choice of use of an 
international currency, thus creating incumbency advantages for the dominant international 
currency and implying that the international use of a currency is not linearly related to the 
issuing state’s mere numerical share in the world economy (Chinn and Frankel 2007; 
Krugman 1984).
25
 And, importantly, the power of network externalities suggests that the 
use of a single international currency is more efficient than that of multiple ones, implying 
monopoly by a single international currency as a natural consequence (Kenen 2002; Lim 
2006).  
 The effect of network externalities on international currency choice is in fact, however, 
more controversial than those of the other two major economic determinants of currency 
internationalization. Some recent studies argue that it is weaker than those who take a 
single international currency system for granted expect, emphasizing the feasibility of a 
                                                                                                                                                    
because the factors that affect liquidity and those that influence transactional network are quite different from 
each other. In fact, prior to Helleiner, Cohen (1998: 96-97) also identified three essential economic attributes 
of international currencies. His classification is slightly different from Helleiner’s, however, in that, while 
both indicate confidence and transactional network as two of the three attributes, Cohen considers both 
liquidity and predictability of asset value as two aspects of his remaining attribute. 
25
 Indeed, while the dollar accounts for more than 60 percent of the world’s foreign exchange reserves today, 
the US share of gross world product is only slightly higher than 20 percent. The slower erosion of sterling’s 
international standing than that of actual British economic hegemony is another example widely referred to in 
this respect. See Chinn and Frankel (2007), Flandreau and Jobst (2009) and Krugman (1984).  
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multiple international currency system in contrast.
26
 They show, for instance, contrary to 
the conventional account that sterling did not lose its dominant international currency status 
until the end of World War Two, that the dollar first took over sterling’s international 
position (as the reserve currency and also as the major source of trade credit) in the mid-
1920s, when it shared leading international currency status with it, although sterling 
subsequently regained that position in the 1930s (Eichengreen and Flandreau 2008; 2012). 
In response to these findings, those regarding a single international currency system as 
natural point out that even the 1920s was decades after US emergence as the world’s 
greatest economic power, and so the strength of the incumbency advantages enjoyed by 
sterling remain clear (Cohen 2012a: 25). This counterargument does not disprove the 
feasibility of a multiple international currency system, however, even though it 
reemphasizes the effect of inertia in international currency use.  
 Alongside the three major economic attributes of an international currency, there is one 
more important economic issue related to currency internationalization that merits 
discussion. This is the question of how the currency is to be supplied to the rest of the 
world, given that foreigners have to first accumulate it before they can use it. A currency 
can be supplied to the world through either the current account or the capital account 
channel. A country’s running of a current account deficit is one path through which its 
currency can be supplied to foreigners, as shown by the US in running its huge current 
account deficits over the past decades.
27
 A current account deficit of the issuing state may 
on the other hand also negatively affect international use of its currency, however, by 
weakening foreign confidence in the currency. Yet a currency can be also supplied to 
foreigners through capital account intermediation, in other words by borrowing short and 
lending long. Indeed, both the United Kingdom and the United States supplied their 
currencies to the world through this channel in the past—prior to World War One and in the 
mid-twentieth century, respectively—while running persistent current account surpluses 
(Cohen 2012a: 26-27; Despres et al. 1965: 526; Eichengreen 2005: 13-14).  
 
Political factors 
 
Meanwhile, there has in recent years been a growing number of political economy studies 
drawing attention to the question of how politics influences currency internationalization. 
Helleiner (2008) provides a useful framework for approaching this question, identifying 
two discrete channels through which politics can impact a currency’s international use: a 
direct and an indirect one. Through the indirect channel, politics affects the currency’s 
international use by impacting its economic determinants, which were discussed above. 
Through the direct channel, it does so more directly, without regard to these economic 
determinants.  
                                                 
26
 See, for example, Eichengreen (2005; 2010; 2011a), Eichengreen and Flandreau (2008; 2012) and Schenk 
(2010).   
27
 Fratianni (2012: 7) shows that the increase in dollar-denominated reserve assets in foreign countries since 
the 1980s has been associated with the US current account deficit. 
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 Concerning the indirect channel, Walter (2006) argues that domestic policies and 
institutional arrangements affect a currency’s international use by influencing  
the confidence in it and its liquidity, noting conservative monetary policy, central bank 
independence, limited government and pro-creditor legal frameworks as favorable factors.  
Meanwhile, Eichengreen and Flandreau (2012) stress that the Fed played a central role in 
promoting dollar internationalization during the 1910s and 1920s by actively building the 
market for dollar-denominated trade credit (known as “bankers’ acceptances”), growth of 
which was crucial to the success of dollar internationalization.
28
 It is also noteworthy, 
regarding sterling’s dominant international position prior to the dollar’s rise, that from the 
early eighteenth century on the UK government adopted deliberate measures in its colonies 
aimed at enhancing the liquidity of the London financial market (Eichengreen 2005: 5-6). 
 In connection with the direct channel, on the other hand, Helleiner (2008) elucidates 
the ways in which politics affects international currency standing by revisiting Strange’s 
(1971) concept of international currencies. He notes that politics matters in particular for 
master and negotiated currencies, as discussed earlier, while top and neutral currencies 
derive their international standings mainly from their inherent economic attractiveness with 
the role of politics being relatively limited. For a master currency, the issuing state plays 
the primary role, as it exercises coercive power over subordinate states. For a negotiated 
currency, however, both the issuing state and the foreign states supporting the currency, and 
their interactions, influence its international use. 
 The issuing state’s decision on whether to promote or hinder the international use of its 
currency hinges on various political factors at both the domestic and the international levels, 
including the domestic political struggle between those who benefit and those who lose out 
from the currency’s internationalization, policymakers’ perceptions of the costs and 
benefits of internationalization, the political and economic relationships between the 
issuing state and other states, and the actions of the states issuing other international 
currencies. A state’s decision on whether to support a foreign currency’s international use 
can also be affected by diverse political economy factors at both of these levels—for 
example its political, security and economic relations with the issuing state, the pressures 
from private domestic interests with close ties to the issuing state, the ideational beliefs of 
key policymakers, and other states’ choices concerning whether or not to support the 
currency’s international standing (Helleiner 2008: 365-366).  
 There are also a few studies that provide more systematic analyses of how such 
political factors directly impact currency internationalization. One group focuses on the 
domestic politics of the issuing state. For example, Broz (1997) and Helleiner and Malkin 
(2012) address the domestic distributional effects of currency internationalization and the 
resulting formations of domestic coalitions with conflicting preferences related to it. As 
mentioned earlier, however, these two studies differ in that the latter opposes 
“comprehensive” generalizations of sectoral interests regarding currency 
                                                 
28
 When the Fed withdrew from the market in the 1930s, it collapsed almost completely (Eichengreen and 
Flandreau 2012). 
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internationalization, emphasizing that the specific preferences of domestic groups change in 
accordance with the contexts involved.
29
  
 Meanwhile, contrary to the domestic approaches, another group calls attention to 
systemic factors. Chey (2013), for instance, argues that the international political power of 
the issuing state—which operates in diverse forms, including hard, soft and structural 
power—directly increases foreign actors’ incentives to use its currency. Posen (2008) and 
Momani (2008) also highlight the impact of the security relations between the issuing and 
other states upon international use of its currency. Helleiner (2003) notes in addition that 
when the dollar was emerging as an international currency in the early twentieth century, 
US policymakers actively employed “dollarization diplomacy” in many Latin American 
countries, through the growing US military, political and economic influence in the region, 
to encourage their use of the dollar.
30
 Pittaluga and Seghezza (2012) stress the role of the 
issuing state’s international power in its currency’s international use as well, but from a 
somewhat different perspective, arguing that its ability to invest in costly currency 
internationalization and pay for this by taxing foreigners through international seigniorage 
gains is necessary for the currency’s international use.31 These studies commonly suggest 
that a currency’s internationalization—especially at the public level—depends significantly 
upon the issuing state’s foreign policy.   
 
Relative weights of determinants  
 
One of the key issues regarding the various determinants of currency internationalization is 
their relative importances. This issue remains controversial, however, and is in fact the very 
point at which the different theoretical perspectives conflict with each other. Different 
perspectives or theories put different weights on various of these determinants, depending 
upon which type of factor—political or economic—they assess as more critical, and also 
upon which individual political or economic factors they emphasize.  
 There are some noteworthy points that may help in considering this vital issue, 
however. First, when a currency is either on the rise or in decline internationally, the weight 
of political factors is likely to increase and that of economic ones to decrease. The 
currency’s intrinsic economic properties tend in such times to be insufficiently strong to 
secure its status as a top currency, and its characteristics as a negotiated currency are 
accordingly likely to strengthen. Indeed, for instance, the prolonged use of sterling as a 
major international currency since World War Two is frequently attributed to political 
rather than economic factors—for example its use in the sterling area.32  
 The balance between states and markets in the global economic system may also affect 
the relative importances of the political and the economic determinants of international 
                                                 
29
 They indicate, for instance, that financial interests in Japan and Germany opposed internationalizations of 
their currencies, in contrast to the case with the dollar.   
30
 A major US domestic group that strongly supported dollarization diplomacy was financial institutions, who 
were motivated to earn denomination rents (Helleiner 2003).   
31
 This research thus suggests that the use of a certain international currency is not the outcome of coercion by 
the issuing state, but that of a political exchange between it and other states. 
32
 See, for example, Eichengreen (2011a) and Schenk (2010).  
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currency standing (Helleiner 2009: 87). Given such recent noticeable trends as the 
substantial rise in states’ holdings of foreign exchange reserves, and the emergence of 
sovereign wealth funds as new major global investors, states’ influences in the global 
economy appear to have strengthened relative to those of the markets, implying a growing 
weight of political factors in the determination of international currency status (Helleiner 
2009: 77-78).  
 There is of course still need for further study of other potential determinants of 
international currency standing, and this issue will be discussed in a later section. 
 
 
V. Future prospects for the international monetary order 
 
As noted earlier, one of the central debates in the wake of the global financial crisis is 
whether the current dollar-centered international monetary system will persist. In this 
regard, different perspectives with different theoretical backgrounds present conflicting 
outlooks. A key area in which the optimistic and the pessimistic views of the dollar’s future 
conflict is their contrasting assessments of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
dollar as an international currency, compared to its rivals—the euro being the strongest at 
the moment but the renminbi also in the longer term. The sanguine view emphasizes that 
the dollar’s attractiveness remains relatively strong vis-à-vis its alternatives, largely due to 
their own defects as international currencies, while the negative view implicitly assumes 
the opposite, highlighting the dollar’s own weaknesses.33  
 
The positive view of the dollar 
 
The sanguine view of the dollar’s future holds that the dollar’s economic attributes as an 
international currency remain strong and/or that political conditions are in its favor.  
 In more detail, with regard to the dollar’s economic attractiveness and its political 
underpinnings, a good number of studies emphasize the United States’ global supremacy in 
political and military power as the ultimate source of confidence in the dollar, with the 
absence of financial markets in other currencies that can match the US Treasury market in 
terms of liquidity and scale, and the likelihood of network externalities and inertia also 
helping the dollar to preserve its dominant position.
34
  
 In connection with the direct political determinants of currency internationalization, on 
the other hand, a group of studies stresses that the international political power of the U.S. 
remains far greater than those of other states, including both the eurozone countries and 
China, and that this will contribute greatly to the dollar’s maintenance of its status as 
                                                 
33 Helleiner and Kirshner (2009a) divide the conflicting perspectives as to the dollar’s future into three 
categories: the “market-based,” the “instrumental,” and the “geopolitical” perspectives. However, this study 
classifies them simply into two broad groups, of the positive and the negative outlooks, as doing so enables 
clearer demonstration of the differentiated assessments of the dollar and its major rivals in terms of the 
various determinants of currency internationalization, and also as there are some studies that do not fit well 
into any of Helleiner’s and Kirshner’s three categories. 
34 See, for example, Chey (2013), Cooper (2010), Helleiner (2009), James (2009) and McNamara (2008). 
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leading international currency.
35
 Moreover, foreign states may have voluntary incentives of 
their own to use the dollar. For instance, the so-called Bretton Woods Two thesis claims 
that East Asian countries have supported the dollar’s value by accumulating massive 
amounts of dollar reserves to keep their own currencies undervalued and thereby boost their 
exports (Dooley et al. 2004; 2009). Emerging economies may also peg to the dollar for the 
sake of domestic price stability (McKinnon 2009).  
 In contrast to the case with the dollar, the absence of a central political authority in the 
eurozone adversely affects confidence in the euro and the development of euro financial 
markets. Europe is moreover unlikely to assume the role of “importer of last resort,” as the 
United States has, which would expand other countries’ opportunities to obtain euros. 
European policymakers appear in addition to have actually discouraged expansion of the 
eurozone, through measures such as imposition of strict requirements for eurozone entry 
and opposition to unilateral pegging to the euro, out of worries about euro appreciation, 
constraints on monetary policy, etc. The possibility of the active promotion of euro 
internationalization causing direct conflict with the United States is also likely to 
discourage efforts in this direction. Indeed, the euro’s international role has a strong 
regional character, as it is largely limited to the eurozone and its hinterland.
36
  
 Meanwhile, despite China’s strong economic growth, low inflation, exchange rate 
stability, etc., a large number of studies express doubt as to the feasibility of renminbi 
internationalization, at least in the near future.
37
 Much research notes the low capital 
account convertibility of the renminbi and the underdevelopment of Chinese financial 
markets as critical economic factors that hinder renminbi internationalization. Many 
observers moreover see the Chinese government as unlikely to adopt aggressive measures 
to remove these problems, as that would require abandonment of the Chinese development 
model whose main instruments include credit controls and export-led growth. The 
authoritarian nature of the Chinese political regime has also been often indicated as a 
political factor inimical to financial market development and confidence in the renminbi, as 
it may raise foreign doubts about the Chinese commitment to a market economy. 
Furthermore, China’s economic size is still much smaller than that of the United States, and 
will remain so for a quite some time.
38
 All of these factors are expected to reduce the 
likelihood of the renminbi posing a serious threat to the dollar in the foreseeable future.
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 See, for example, Chey (2012a; 2013), Pittaluga and Seghezza (2012) and Posen (2008). 
36
 See Cohen (2009a; 2009c), Cooper (2009; 2010), D’Arista (2009), ECB (2009), Helleiner (2009), McNama
ra (2008), Pittaluga and Seghezza (2012) and Posen (2008). All of the countries that peg their exchange rates 
to the euro are EU membership candidates, for instance, with the exceptions of those in the CFA franc zone 
whose pegs to the euro are based on their foreign policy relations with France, their former colonizer (Posen 
2008: 92). 
37
 See, for example, Chey (2012a; 2013), Cohen (2009c; 2012b), Cooper (2009; 2010), Dobson and Masson 
(2009), Eichengreen (2009a), Helleiner (2009), Helleiner and Malkin (2012), IMF (2010), Lee (2010), Wu 
(2009) and Wu et al. (2010).  
38
 Chey (2013) points out that the US economy was more than twice as large as that of the UK in the early 
1910s, when the dollar began emerging as a consequential international currency, and had grown to more than 
four times as big by the late 1920s when the dollar replaced sterling for the first time as leading international 
currency.  
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The negative view of the dollar 
 
In contrast, the pessimists about the dollar’s future expect its dominant position to erode 
due to a decline in its economic attractiveness and/or retreat of foreign, as well as possibly 
domestic, support for it.
39
 Many holding this view, notably, do not expect a single currency 
to replace the dollar as the dominant international currency. There are a few more radical 
views, such as Chinn and Frankel (2008a; 2007; 2008b) who predicted the euro’s 
overtaking of the dollar as early as in the mid-2010s.
40
 But a majority of the studies in this 
camp tend to instead anticipate emergence of a multiple international currency system, 
generally one based on the dollar, the euro and the renminbi. And in this view, therefore, 
while the dollar will no longer be dominant as before it will not lose its international status 
entirely but remain one of the major international currencies.      
 Firstly, with regard to the dollar’s economic attractiveness, this view considers the huge 
US current account deficit and loose US fiscal and monetary policies since the global 
financial crisis as likely to damage foreign confidence in the dollar. The fall in US import 
capacity since the crisis may in addition reduce foreigners’ motivations for holding dollars. 
At the same time, trade patterns in many East Asian countries, major holders of dollar 
reserves, have increasingly shifted away from the United States to the intraregional and 
European markets. Skeptics of the dollar’s future also stress the limitations of network 
effects and inertia in international currency use.
41
    
 The political foundations of foreign support for the dollar appear to have weakened as 
well, as China, a geopolitical rival of the United States, has become the biggest dollar 
holder (Helleiner 2009: 81; Kirshner 2009: 195-196).
42
 Serious observers of course usually 
deny the likelihood of China dumping its enormous dollar holdings; the resulting abrupt 
dollar depreciation would be very much against its own interests, due to not only the 
substantial decline in value of its dollar holdings that would ensue but also the consequent 
loss of Chinese export competitiveness.
43
 Yet it is still possible that China will eventually 
diversify its reserve portfolio away from the dollar, moving to alternatives such as the 
euro.
44
 Traditional US allies like Western Europe and Japan are moreover no longer bound 
to the United States with the end of the Cold War, and have in fact become rather wary of 
US unilateralism, although such concerns appear to have weakened to some extent since 
Barack Obama gained the US presidency in 2009.
45
 
                                                 
39 See, for example, Bergsten (2011), Chinn and Frankel (2008b), Cohen (2009b; 2009c), Eichengreen (2010; 
2011a; 2011b) and Kirshner (2009). 
40
 This research, which was conducted prior to the European debt crisis, has significant drawbacks in that its 
analysis included only a very limited set of economic determinants of currency internationalization.  
41 See Chinn and Frankel (2008a: 51), Eichengreen (2005; 2010; 2011a) and Ferguson (2009).  
42 China is estimated to possess about one-half of all US Treasuries held by official foreign holders 
(Eichengreen 2011a: 135). Russia, meanwhile, another geopolitical rival of the US, is the world’s third largest 
foreign exchange reserve holder.   
43
 See Cooper (2009: 5-6), Eichengreen (2011a: 135-136) and Kirshner (2009: 198).  
44 See Bowles and Wang (2008), Eichengreen (2011a: 51) and Kirshner (2008: 429; 2009: 198). 
45 See Calleo (2009: 185), Eichengreen (2011a: 122), Helleiner and Kirshner (2009a: 16-17) and Kirshner 
(2009). 
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 Meanwhile, it is also possible that the willingness of the US itself to defend the dollar’s 
international role might falter. Indeed, C. Fred Bergsten (2011), director of the major US 
think tank the Peterson Institute for International Economics, argues that the dollar’s role as 
the leading international currency is no longer in the US national interest. The dollar’s 
prominent international position, he asserts, encourages huge inflows of foreign capital to 
the United States, with detrimental macroeconomic effects on its economy as shown in the 
global financial crisis, while also impeding the currency’s substantial depreciation against 
the renminbi and other currencies which he argues is necessary for US economic recovery. 
Helleiner’s and Malkin’s (2012) political economy study meanwhile analyzes US domestic 
groups, even including financial interests, as unlikely to strongly push for vigorous 
government defense of the dollar’s international status. If domestic support for the dollar’s 
international role weakens, US policymakers may be reluctant to offer the inducements 
necessary to encourage continued foreign backing of the currency’s international position. 
 The negative view of the dollar’s future also stresses that the dollar’s dominant position 
has been supported by the absence of rivals, and that their emergence—that of the euro 
most likely, and also of the renminbi in the longer term—will increase the likelihood of 
foreigners’ withdrawal from the dollar.46  
 
Assessment of the competing prospects 
 
Which prospect is more convincing? It is of course very difficult for any social science 
research to predict the future accurately. Nevertheless, given that many of the existing 
prospects stand on narrow analyses focused on only a limited set of currency 
internationalization determinants, it may be worth contemplating this question here by 
providing a more synthetic, or balanced, view through joint consideration of all of the 
various determinants discussed. There in fact appears little doubt that the dollar’s intrinsic 
economic attractiveness as an international currency has weakened since the global 
financial crisis, even though it still did play the role of safe haven currency during that 
time.
47
 Yet the key question is whether the dollar’s potential rivals will ever actually be 
able to achieve greater attractiveness than the dollar, in relative terms.
48
  
 As for the euro, the European debt crisis, which started from Greece in the spring of 
2010, spread thereafter to Ireland and Portugal, and most recently reached Spain in 2012, 
has highlighted how the peculiar characteristic of the euro as a currency without a state can 
be a serious problem for it. In the absence of a central authority, eurozone countries’ 
cooperative management of the crisis has been clumsy, damaging the credibility of 
                                                 
46 See, for example, Eichengreen (2011a: 135-136). 
47 Indeed, in August 2011 Standard and Poor’s, the world’s second largest credit rating agency, downgraded 
the US long-term sovereign rating by one notch from triple A to double A plus, questioning the validity of the 
US fiscal consolidation plan. Immediately after the US rating downgrade, however, prices of US Treasuries 
ironically surged, revealing the market sentiment that there was still no alternative to the dollar as safe haven 
currency at a time when worries about the euro’s future had grown prevalent.  
48
 Meanwhile, Posen (2008: 96) warns that even in the absence of strong alternative currencies a significant 
decline in the dollar’s inherent attractiveness as an international currency can lead it to lose its dominant 
international status, inducing fragmentation of the world monetary system.   
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eurozone governance and accordingly market confidence in the euro. Many observers, 
including Noble laureate economist Krugman (2010a; 2010b), have indeed even postulated 
a possible breakup of the euro, warning that debt-ridden countries may choose instead of 
painful and politically costly austerity to exit the eurozone, to make devaluations of their 
own national currencies possible. And many euro-skeptics in fact criticize the lack of a 
central eurozone political authority as ultimately meaning that euro adoption took place 
before member countries were even ready for a single currency.   
 Although disintegration of the eurozone may thus be no longer absolutely unthinkable, 
however, its possibility does not seem high. Most of all, the political will for European 
integration, in creating and preserving the euro, should not be underestimated. The euro has 
in fact been a fundamentally political, rather than a mere economic, project, and its collapse 
would threaten the very existence of the European Union (Eichengreen 2009b: 20; 2011a: 
70, 94; Wolf 2011). Indeed, as the crisis has deepened eurozone governments have 
strengthened cooperation to save the euro, introducing diverse significant measures.
49
 It 
should be noted, in addition, that if a country chooses to exit the eurozone and reintroduce a 
national currency, the cost to it may actually greatly surpass its benefits, at least in the short 
run. And indeed, Greece has decided to stay in the eurozone despite virulent domestic 
protests against the painful austerity measures attached to its rescue packages.  
 It may thus be reasonable to anticipate likelihood of the euro managing to survive, 
despite the European debt crisis. Its international use may even increase to some extent as 
the links between the eurozone and non-eurozone members of the EU and aspiring 
candidates to it deepen, leading them to increase their use of the euro in transactions with 
the eurozone (Cooper 2010). In fact, with Estonia’s accession at the beginning of 2011, the 
eurozone has actually expanded during the crisis. Moreover, there is a view that departure 
of weak economies from the eurozone might not in fact trigger a euro collapse, but rather 
strengthen the currency in the long run (The Economist 2011). Barring a substantial 
strengthening of the political foundations of the euro, however, its international use is likely 
to be still limited largely to the eurozone and areas nearby. 
 As to the renminbi, as part of its strategy to reduce China’s dependence on the dollar, 
and also perhaps to enhance its influence in the world,
50
 the Chinese government has since 
the global financial crisis begun to actively promote the currency’s internationalization. As 
a result, and despite many obstacles, internationalization of the renminbi has accelerated 
over the recent few years, although its degree does still remain low.
51
 And alongside this 
                                                 
49
 In May 2010 the eurozone governments created the European Financial Stability Facility, a temporary 
eurozone rescue fund which together with the IMF has bailed out the four crisis-hit countries, and in 
September 2012 replaced it with the European Stability Mechanism, a permanent bailout fund with a 
maximum lending capacity of 500 billion euros. In December 2011, they signed a new fiscal rule with an 
automatic correction mechanism. And then in June 2012 they agreed to introduce a new system of European 
banking supervision via the European Central Bank (ECB), a move deemed as a first step toward a full 
banking union, as well as to allow the eurozone’s rescue fund to recapitalize troubled banks directly. The ECB 
has in addition also actively provided liquidity to the eurozone. 
50
 For analyses of the Chinese government intention with regard to renminbi internationalization, see Cohen 
(2012b) and Mallaby and Wethington (2012).  
51
 For details on the Chinese government policies for reminibi internationalization, and recent developments 
related to renminbi internationalization, see Chey (2013). 
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phenomenon the number of positive views about the feasibility of renminbi 
internationalization has in fact been recently increasing.
52
  
 It should be noted, however, that most studies with strongly positive expectations for 
renminbi internationalization tend to consider economic factors only, and even worse 
actually just a very limited set of economic factors. In contrast, those that take into account 
political conditions, either domestic or systemic, tend to suggest more negative outlooks for 
renminbi internationalization.
53
 Such a tendency of political economy research to produce 
views more favorable for the dollar is in fact found in the discussions related to the euro’s 
future as well.  
 In actuality, and for the foreseeable future, a more realistic question regarding renminbi 
internationalization may be that of whether the renminbi can evolve into a regional 
currency in Asia. The prospect for this appears brighter than that for renminbi replacement 
of the dollar at the global level, as Asia is the region where China’s political and economic 
influences are strongest in the world (Chey 2013). And the Chinese government in fact 
appears to have set a goal of developing the renminbi into a regional currency in Asia first, 
and to have been adopting deliberate policies toward this end.
54
   
 It should be noted, however, that the development of the renminbi as a regional 
currency in Asia will not mean complete disappearance of the dollar from the region. 
Geopolitical factors seem likely to help slow reduction in the dollar’s influence in Asia. 
Although smaller countries may have stronger incentives to accommodate China more as 
its power strengthens, rivals of China such as Japan and India may not wish to depend 
solely on the renminbi if there is an alternative, which the dollar may continue to be for the 
foreseeable future (Chey 2013).  
 Meanwhile, the idea of enhancing the role of the Special Drawing Right (SDR)—a 
synthetic unit of account of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—has attracted great 
attention in the wake of the global financial crisis. There are a number of significant 
economic and political problems hindering realization of this idea, however. Most of all, 
there is no private market in which SDRs can be traded, and creation of one is a difficult 
task. Also, the governance structure of the IMF hinders timely and sufficient SDR creation 
(Eichengreen 2011a: 138-141; Kenen 2010). Indeed, even many proponents of a 
strengthening of the SDR’s role anticipate that the SDR would be able to play only a 
modest role, mainly as a reserve asset subsidiary to the international currencies issued by 
national governments.
55
   
 Ultimately, the dollar is in the foreseeable future thus likely to maintain its status as the 
leading international currency. Its international standing is likely to decline, however, due 
largely to a rise of the renminbi in Asia, while the euro’s international role does not change 
considerably. The system will therefore be an uneven multiple currency system, in which 
the euro and the renminbi play significant roles as regional currencies in Europe and in 
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 One remarkable example is a study by the ECB (Fratzscher and Mehl 2011) that sees the international 
monetary system as a tripolar system already, with the renminbi making up one pole alongside the dollar and 
the euro. 
53
 For a domestic study, see Helleiner and Malkin (2012), and for a systemic study see Chey (2013). 
54
 For further details on the Chinese policies, see Chey (2013).  
55 See, for example, Kenen (2010) and Ocampo (2010). 
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Asia, respectively, but are unable to compete with the dollar at the global level, leaving it 
first among the three of them.   
 
 
VI. Issues for further consideration  
 
Although the previous section presents an assessment of the future prospects for the 
international monetary order, it is only tentative. The study of international currencies—
especially in the political economy realm—is still in an early stage of development, and a 
number of important issues actually demand further investigation to improve our 
understanding of international currencies. Among others, this study draws special attention 
now to the following issues: historical events, the political determinants of currency 
internationalization, government policy strategies, and the consequences of international 
currency choice.  
 
Historical events 
 
Firstly, political economy research tends to rely on the study of economic history to a large 
extent, in examining historical “facts.” This tendency is certainly understandable, given the 
limited time for research as well as the dominance of economic history research in the 
literature. It should be stressed, however, that many historical events in fact do still remain 
controversial. As discussed above, for instance, there is on-going debate among economic 
historians at present over the time when the dollar first overtook sterling as the leading 
international currency. Also, while it is typically understood that the dollar’s replacement of 
sterling as the dominant international currency was complete by the end of World War Two, 
a recent study (Schenk 2010) shows that sterling still accounted for 87 percent of world 
foreign exchange reserves in 1947, and more than 50 percent even during the 1950s, and 
that the share of reserves held in dollars exceeded that held in sterling only after 1955 
(following a 30 percent devaluation of sterling). The controversies surrounding historical 
events thus suggest a need for political economy studies to be cautious and critical in 
dealing with historical “facts.”  
  
The political determinants of currency internationalization 
 
There is also a strong need for further development of political theories of the determinants 
of currency internationalization. Although the literature has noted a list of such political 
determinants, in many cases it only touches slightly on them and more systematic research 
concerning many of them is necessary. A few recent studies—for example Chey (2013), on 
the international political power of the issuing state, and Helleiner and Malkin (2012), on 
domestic sectoral interests in the issuing state—have made significant progress in this 
regard. Yet these studies cover only a small portion of the diverse political determinants of 
currency internationalization, while many of their arguments remain debatable and in need 
of further clarification.  
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 For instance, in measuring and portraying the international power of a country, a 
widely-used indicator is its economic power, which is measured by its economic size, share 
in world trade, etc. These factors are in fact also those that coincidently affect the economic 
attractiveness of the country’s currency, however, complicating judgment of whether their 
impacts on currency internationalization run through political or economic channels. With 
regard to domestic sectoral preferences concerning currency internationalization, 
meanwhile, the changing balance between the costs and benefits of issuing an international 
currency over its lifetime may significantly impact these preferences, further complicating 
their identification.  
 There are in addition a good number of potentially significant political determinants of 
currency internationalization to which the literature has as yet paid slight attention. One 
example is the role of transnational private interests, whose powerful influence in the world 
political economy has been recognized by much political economy research in other issue 
areas such as international financial regulation.
56
 Transnational private interests may play a 
significant role with regard to the international use of certain currencies as well, as shown 
by the way in which financial institutions in the London eurodollar market have influenced 
global use of the dollar. It is also noteworthy that the Chinese government at present allows 
only a small prestigious group of foreign financial institutions to participate in the renminbi 
business, a policy that may provide them opportunities to preempt the market for the 
international renminbi business and capture rents from renminbi internationalization, and 
thereby encourage their powerful and effective promotion of renminbi use overseas. Indeed, 
a group of prominent  international banks, among them HSBC, Standard Chartered, 
Citigroup and JPMorgan, have recently been holding international roadshows to promote 
use of the renminbi by their corporate customers for trade deals with China, instead of the 
dollar. Some of them have moreover offered financial incentives, such as discounted 
transaction fees, to firms opting to settle their trades in renminbi (Cookson 2010). It 
moreover bears noting that British financial institutions have recently pressed for London to 
become an offshore renminbi trading center (Blitz 2011a; 2011b).
57
 
 To turn attention to domestic factors, the political institutions of the issuing state may 
also impact its currency’s internationalization. Similar to the case with the sectoral interests 
approach, the institutional study of currency internationalization may draw useful insights 
from the institutional theories of exchange rate regime choice.
58
 In this regard, one 
interesting question may be whether and how the Chinese authoritarian system has affected 
and is affecting internationalization of the renminbi. Yet institutional study may also be 
applied to compare the rises of sterling and the dollar as the leading international currencies, 
given for example the much more limited extent of the democratic institutions in existence 
in the case of sterling. 
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 See, for example, Porter (2005). 
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 As a result, in February 2013 the British and Chinese governments agreed to establish a renminbi-sterling 
currency swap agreement in the near future (Kuchler et al. 2013). 
58
 For the institutional study of exchange rate regime choice, see for example Bernhard and Leblang (1999), 
Broz (2002) and Hallerberg (2002). 
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Government policy strategies   
 
It is also worth identifying specific government policy strategies that influence the 
internationalization of a currency, and the mechanisms through which they work. One 
remarkable strategy in this regard, especially in connection with renminbi 
internationalization, is China’s strategy of promoting renminbi internationalization through 
development of the offshore renminbi market in Hong Kong. This issue is actually related 
to the crucial question of whether financial liberalization, including capital account 
convertibility, is necessary for internationalization of the currency. A majority of studies of 
currency internationalization, including those of renminbi internationalization, tend to 
presuppose financial liberalization as one of its preconditions.
59
 The relationship between 
financial liberalization and currency internationalization is an issue that needs to be 
elaborately tested, however, rather than presupposed. Indeed, contrary to the common 
perception, a recent study by He and McCauley (2010) suggests full capital account 
liberalization to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for currency 
internationalization, and that promoting the development of offshore markets can help 
currency internationalization while allowing the issuing country to retain control over its 
capital account.
60
 Thus, as Subacchi (2010) notes, China’s experiment of trying to achieve 
renminbi internationalization mainly through its offshore market in Hong Kong, with 
limited liberalization on the mainland, should not be judged ex ante as doomed to fail 
simply because of the lack of historical precedents.
61
  
 Another potential policy deserving greater attention regarding renminbi 
internationalization, especially in Asia, is China’s purchases of Asian countries’ sovereign 
debt, which would be a form of direct exercise of China’s power. Such a policy might place 
upward pressures on the values of these countries’ currencies, thus increasing their 
incentives to buy Chinese debt in response, if allowed, to prevent the values of their own 
currencies from rising and in turn defend their exports. And that would of course ultimately 
also help renminbi internationalization in Asia. In this regard, the Chinese government did 
actually purchase large amounts of Japanese and South Korean government bonds briefly in 
the fall of 2010, causing the yen and the Korean won to rise significantly and leading the 
Japanese finance minister to complain about how China’s closed capital account prevented 
Japan from reciprocating (Financial Times 2010). It is also worth noting that diversification 
of China’s foreign exchange reserves portfolio is one of the main goals in its 12th Five-
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 The underlying logic is that limits on liberalization raise the transaction costs of the currency concerned, 
and that competition among alternative currencies will lead to abandonment of those with higher transaction 
costs (Genberg 2010: 66). 
60 The study emphasizes how the significant US capital controls in the 1960s and early 1970s did not in fact 
undermine the dollar’s international role, but in some ways rather contributed to growth of the eurodollar 
market, without which the dollar may not have obtained the dominant international currency standing it 
enjoys today. 
61 The strategy may allow China to push internationalization of the renminbi gradually under conditions of 
financial stability, providing it an opportunity to learn from Hong Kong’s experience of renminbi 
internationalization. 
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Year Plan (2011-5), as such diversification might be realized through growing purchases of 
Asian government bonds and help facilitate renminbi internationalization in the region.
62
  
 
The consequences of international currency choice 
 
Finally, from a practical viewpoint, comprehensive analysis needs to be undertaken of the 
consequences for countries of their uses of particular foreign currencies. This has critical 
policy-related importance to non-issuing states, since such analysis can provide guidelines 
regarding which international currency they should choose to use, for example between the 
dollar and the renminbi. The calculation will of course differ across countries, depending 
upon their specific domestic and international political economic contexts. And a low 
generalizability of analysis of any single case is thus implied. Nevertheless, alongside the 
great practical implications for the individual countries concerned, analysis of this issue can 
provide explanation of why certain foreign actors use particular international currencies, 
and in turn why any particular international currency prevails (and will prevail) at a given 
time.  
 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
After a long period in the doldrums, the political economy study of international currencies 
has at last begun to make significant progress since outbreak of the global financial crisis, 
which reintroduced debate about the future of the dollar as the leading international 
currency. The subsequent European debt crisis and the Chinese government’s active 
promotion of renminbi internationalization have also helped further in drawing political 
economists’ attention to international currency issues. And although such growing interest 
in international currencies within political economy circles appears belated, it is highly 
desirable. International currencies affect the characteristics of the international monetary 
system, which in turn shapes the world political economy by influencing the political and 
economic relationships among countries. The study of international currencies is thus vital 
for understanding the establishment of and changes in the world order.  
 The political economy study of international currencies is still in its early stage, 
however, despite its significant development recently. Indeed, much of the literature cited 
in this study comes from the economics discipline, and much broader political economy 
research on international currencies is necessary. And in this regard this study has 
highlighted, among others, four particular issue areas—historical events, the political 
determinants of currency internationalization, government policy strategies, and the 
consequences of international currency choice—as among those needing further research. 
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 Indeed, a recent study (Zhang 2011) by a senior research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
the premier academic research organization in the field of social sciences in China, proposes that the country 
substitute Asian government bonds for US Treasuries as its foreign exchange reserves—under the 
exceptionally politically bold title of “Is it Desirable for Asian Economies to Hold More Asian Assets in Their 
Foreign Exchange Reserves? The People’s Republic of China’s Answer.” 
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The study of these issues is expected to contribute to the building of a better analytical 
framework for the study of international currencies. The ongoing Chinese experiment in 
internationalization of the renminbi provides a valuable opportunity to study these issues. 
Yet, at the same time, political economy study even of the emergences of the historical key 
international currencies—sterling and the dollar—also remains underdeveloped,63 and 
revisiting these critical historical events is thus highly likely to contribute greatly to the 
literature as well.    
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